

SECRETIAC-D-99
22 August 1955***Army Declass/Release Instructions On File***
Declassification/Release Instructions on File**I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E**International Communism

1. For the consideration of the IAC there is submitted herewith a memorandum from the Deputy AC of S, G-2, to the Chairman of the IAC expressing concern regarding the production and handling of intelligence information and intelligence production on international communism (Tab A).

2. Relative to this subject there is attached for the information of the IAC a report (Tab B) on the recently concluded discussions between CIA and the State Department on the location of responsibility for expanded production in this field. These discussions were undertaken as noted in IAC-D-82/6, 5 October 1954, "Report to the IAC on Implementation of the Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs and Assets."

3. This report (TAB B), which has been approved by the DCI, states that it was not found practical to centralize in a single agency the responsibility for maintaining and collating for the entire intelligence community the intelligence production in the field of international communism. The expansion of intelligence production contemplated for the State Department coupled with the expansion of effort in CIA on this subject in meeting operational needs should go far to alleviate present inadequacies.

4. The G-2 proposal together with the CIA report will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 30 August.

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Secretary**SECRET**

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3 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Intelligence on International Communism (U)

1. The Department of the Army is concerned by the serious inadequacy of available information on international communism and by certain weaknesses in the intelligence community's handling of this subject. Two major weaknesses are considered to be (a) the lack of an adequate program for the production of basic intelligence on international communism and (b) insufficient coordination of the total collection and production effort of United States intelligence agencies in this field. An example of such deficiency and a discussion of two measures necessary to the improvement of the handling of intelligence on international communism are attached as Inclosure 1.

2. Reference is made to IAC-D-82/6 of 5 October 1954, Report to the IAC on Implementation of the Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs and Assets. That document (page 3) states that "the question of the location of responsibility for expanded production on international communism is currently under discussion between CIA and the Department of State."

3. In view of the above, the Department of the Army recommends that

a. the IAC request that the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the discussion between CIA and the Department of State be reported at an early date;

b. the IAC review the overall program for the collection and production of intelligence on international communism in order to strengthen the total effort in this field; and

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c. in the course of the recommended review the IAC consider

(1) the assignment of a single agency of responsibility for maintaining and collating for the entire intelligence community the basic data in the field of international communism.

(2) the activation of an IAC sub-committee to help coordinate the effort of the agencies in collecting and producing intelligence on international communism.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Major General GS
Deputy G-2 (Foreign Operations)

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DISCUSSION

1. In illustration of existing inadequacies in the IAC agencies' intelligence on international communism the Department of the Army is handicapped by too little information on the covert aspects of communist subversive activities, with particular reference to communist capabilities for sabotage and armed action that will interfere with the operations of our armed forces overseas or those of our allies. An improved program of basic intelligence production is an essential step toward overcoming some of this deficiency. Of equal importance, however, is an increased collection effort, based on closer and more extensive cooperation between the collecting and producing offices.

2. Virtually all IAC agencies need basic data on international communism that will enable them, for example, to assess local communist activity or influence as a measure of regional or national communist capabilities. Detailed information of this nature may be exploited in different ways to meet different agencies' specific requirements, e.g., a careful tabulation of local political and shop steward elections in Italy would help to gauge more accurately not only the trend of communist political strength in that country but the communist potential for armed action as well. No agency, however, now has the resources to perform this close analysis on a continuing basis. Supplementing the published NIS, therefore, the office recommended in paragraph 3c(1) of the basic memorandum would be responsible for maintaining files and preparing basic intelligence reports on specific aspects of Communist overt political or covert subversive activity, both as part of a planned, coordinated program and in response to an urgent request from any IAC agency.

3. An IAC directive of 26 May 1949 established the JIGSAW committee as a permanent inter-departmental committee "to plan and coordinate production of intelligence in the field of international communism, as it affects the national security." In the year that it met regularly, the committee did useful groundwork. Coordinated planning for the production of intelligence on international communism is a continuing need.

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It is also obvious, however, that the covert nature of communist subversive activity requires greater coordination of intelligence production and clandestine operations in this field to improve (1) support to the clandestine collection effort and (2) accuracy of the intelligence produced, including national estimates. The composition of the inter-agency committee recommended in paragraph 3c(2) of the basic memorandum should reflect these needs.

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4 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Organizational Proposal for the Production
of Intelligence on International Communism

1. There appears to be general agreement that the output of finished intelligence on communism needs to be substantially increased. This need has been recognized and voiced from time to time for several years and restated recently in the USIA survey, an OCB paper concerning propaganda against communism, and other internally circulated CIA papers. In order that steps might be taken to provide for the desired increased output, the SA/PC/DCI was directed to examine the appropriate location of primary responsibility for the production of intelligence on international communism and to consult with the Special Assistant/Intelligence, Dept. of State, on this subject. After preliminary consideration of the referenced memorandum, the SA/PC/DCI was directed to develop specific recommendations concerning any desirable expansion of functions and new organizational arrangements within the CIA that might be required to meet the recognized need. This memorandum sets forth a recommended course of action in response to both of these requests.

2. The more important conclusions are that there are three distinguishable intelligence production activities all of which need to be initiated or expanded. They are:

a. The production of finished intelligence of a level of generality useful to policy makers, organized for the most part in the form of studies of institutions, situations, and developments in particular countries,

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including most contributions to NIEs and the NIS and much current intelligence;

b. The provision of operational intelligence in support of FI and CE activities and of specific and detailed information on communist organizations, communication nets and personalities, including much unclassified specific detail useable for propaganda and other PP purposes at home and abroad;

c. Continuing ~~basic and operational research on,~~
and speculative study ~~of~~ communism and the means of
countering communism *based on intelligence research + estimates*
on communism

CONCLUSIONS:

3. That the production of intelligence outlined in paragraph 2a should continue to be the responsibility of the Department of State inasmuch as there is no practical way to divide the subject matter of political and social intelligence as a whole, which is the responsibility of State, into two distinguishable subjects one of which is "Communism" and the other "everything else."

4. That the production of intelligence outlined in paragraph 2b above should be assigned to CIA (DDP).

5. That the activity outlined in paragraph 2c above (which is in part intelligence, in part estimation, and in part speculation on policy) should be carried on by several senior officers serving as a Senior Research and Planning Staff and attached administratively to the DDI.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

6. To implement the foregoing conclusions it is recommended:

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
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b. That to carry out its production responsibility, CIA enlarge the [redacted] in DDP/CI either through the addition of personnel doing similar work obtained from other parts of DDP or/and the addition of new T.O. to carry out the second production activity, namely, the operational intelligence support. This staff should, of course, have access to operational material in the DDP area but should also make maximum use of intelligence produced in the Department of State and in the offices of the DDI as well as of overt intelligence. The expanded [redacted]

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[redacted] should recognize clearly that its function is not only to provide intelligence support for the Clandestine Services but also to meet the needs of other components of the community for specific and detailed intelligence. In particular it should make every effort to sanitize its product to meet the needs of agencies such as the USIA and the Defense Department.

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c. That several senior officers be assigned to devote themselves to the kind of work described in 2c above. They should be administratively assigned to the DDI, encouraged to develop mutually stimulating relations with the DDP/CI and particularly the [redacted] [redacted] with access to such information as would be relevant to their task. These research and planning officers should not have administrative responsibilities or the management of research programs. They should have the objectivity expected of intelligence officers and, while they should be accessible

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to operational personnel for consultation on operational problems, they should not become involved in operational responsibilities. They should have overt status in order to permit easy consultation with policy officers in other departments, with scholars and academic institutions, and with individuals and institutions of other countries.


SA/PC/DCI

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